Simple heuristics as equilibrium strategies in mutual sequential mate search by Saglam, Ismail
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Simple heuristics as equilibrium
strategies in mutual sequential mate
search
Ismail Saglam
TOBB University of Economics and Technology
24 January 2013
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44222/
MPRA Paper No. 44222, posted 5 February 2013 20:23 UTC
Simple Heuristics as Equilibrium Strategies in
Mutual Sequential Mate Search∗
Ismail Saglam1
Department of Economics, TOBB University of Economics and Technology
Abstract. In this paper, we study whether simple heuristics can arise as equilibrium
strategies in mutual sequential mate search. To this aim, we extend the mate search
model of Todd and Miller (1999), involving an adolescence (learning) phase followed
by an actual mating phase, to a strategic game where the players, as the individuals
in the mating population, choose before starting the adolescence phase, the best
rule - among the four available search (aspiration adjustment) rules - to maximize
their likelihood of mating, given the choice of other individuals. Conducting Monte
Carlo simulations, we show that the use of the Take the Next Best Rule by the
whole population never becomes a (Nash) equilibrium in the simulation range of
adolescence lengths. While the unanimous use of the Adjust Relative Rule by the
whole population arises as an equilibrium for a wide part of the simulation range,
especially for medium to high adolescence lengths, the rules Adjust Up/Down and
Adjust Relative/2 are unanimously chosen as equilibrium strategies for a small part
of the simulation range and only when the adolescence is long and short, respectively.
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1 Introduction
It has been fifty years since the problem of mate search was studied by Gale and
Shapley (1962). Their seminal work offered an iterative algorithm, called the deferred
acceptance algorithm, under which a population of males and females has always a
stable matching where there exist no two agents of opposite sexes who are not a pair
but prefer each other to their current partners, and no individual who is matched
but prefer being single to his/her partner. This algorithm, which was independently
discovered by the National Residency Matching Program (NRMP) in the United
States (US) and had been used since 1950s in matching medical interns with hospital
residency positions (as shown by Roth, 1984), gained its popularity especially with
its use to match students with public high schools in New York City and Boston.2
While the two-sided stable matching model of Gale and Shapley (1962) has led
to the emergence of a large literature in economic theory and applied mechanism
design, the amount of research in this literature studying the formation of marriages
in societies is extremely little.3 One reason is that in marriage environments, unlike
in school choice or hospital-intern problems, there exists no central agency applying
a particular matching algorithm. Besides, individuals have no information about
potential mates before the actual matching takes place. Therefore, it has become
inevitable to study the formation of marriages using ‘decentralized’ and ‘sequential’
models of mate search, where individuals gain, by sequentially encountering some
potential mates, all relevant information on which they base their final mating deci-
sions.4 Relatedly, a strand of literature (Dombrovsky and Perrin, 1994; Mazalov et
2See Abdulkadirog˜lu and So¨nmez (2003) for a pioneering work, and Abdulkadirog˜lu (2013) and
Pathak (2011) for surveys, on school choice, and Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a wide range of
earlier results in stable matching theory.
3Stable matching theory was applied to study the formation/dissolution of marriages only very
recently by Mumcu and Saglam (2008) when utilities are transferable between mates and by Saglam
(2011) under nontransferable utilities.
4See Kalick and Hamilton (1986) for an early example of computer-based, decentralized and
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al., 1996; Todd and Miller, 1999; and Collins et al., 2006) conditioned the informa-
tion for mating decisions on the self mate values of individuals, also assuming that
individuals do not completely know but can partially learn (or approximate) their
self mate values by using feedbacks from potential mates they interact before they
are mated. Among this literature, the paper of Todd and Miller (1999) was the first
to consider a mate-choice model with two-sided (mutual) search strategies. In this
model, individuals first go through an ‘adolescence’ (learning) phase in which they
randomly interact (date) with a number of individuals of the opposite sex and pos-
sibly exchange information with their dates. After each interaction each individual
adjusts his/her aspiration level (as a proxy of his/her self mate value) according to
a particular adjustment rule assumed to be used by the whole population. Individ-
uals next proceed to a ‘mating’ phase where they randomly interact with potential
mates and decide whom to make a proposal for mating. In this phase, each pair of
individuals in the mating pool are considered to be successful and removed from the
pool as mated if they simultaneously make proposals to each other. This phase ends
after a stage at which either the mating pool becomes empty or each individual in
the mating pool has already been paired unsuccessfully with all available individuals
of the opposite sex.
The adjustment rules considered by Todd and Miller (1999) in the adolescence
phase of their model involve Take the Next Best, Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative,
and Adjust Relative/2.5 According to the Take the Next Best Rule, individuals start
the adolescence period with an initial aspiration level of zero, and at each instance
sequential, models of mate search.
5The adjustment rules considered by Todd and Miller (1999) also involve the Mate Value - α
Rule, according to which the aspiration level of each individual is constant over the adolescence
period and formed by subtracting a prescribed constant α (set to 5 in their simulations) from one’s
self mate value. We have chosen to exclude this rule from the scope of our paper since it requires,
as already noted by Todd and Miller (1999), that each individual knows his/her self mate value, a
highly unrealistic assumption.
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of dating each individual sets his/her aspiration to the mate value of his/her date
if that value is above his/her current aspiration level. Thus, individuals leave the
adolescence phase with an aspiration level set to the highest mate value they have
observed.
The remaining three adjustment rules set the initial aspiration level of each indi-
vidual to the average mate value of all individuals of the same sex. These rules also
require that each individual exchanges information with his/her date as to whether
they have found each other desirable; i.e., the observed mate value of the date is
above one’s aspiration level. According to the Adjust Up/Down Rule, each individ-
ual adjusts, at each instance of dating, his/her aspiration upwards by a constant shift
parameter if he/she learns that the date finds him/her desirable, and adjusts his/her
aspiration downwards by the same parameter otherwise. The Adjust Relative Rule
differs from the previous rule in that if the date’s mate value is above the current
aspiration level of an individual and the date still finds this individual desirable,
the individual raises his/her aspiration level. Conversely, if the date’s mate value is
below the current aspiration level of an individual and the date does not find this
individual desirable, the individual reduces his/her aspiration level. In other possi-
ble cases, individuals do not make any adjustments. In Adjust Up/Down Rule and
Adjust Relative Rule, the adjustment parameter is constant during the adolescence
phase and inversely related to the length of this phase (i.e., the common number of
dates interacted by each individual). Finally, the Adjust Relative/2 Rule differs from
Adjust Relative in the adjustment parameter, which is no longer constant during the
adolescence phase but is dependent on the difference between the aspiration level of
each individual and the mate value of his/her date.
Computer simulations of Todd and Miller (1999) show that among the four ad-
justment rules the TNB rule yields the lowest number of matings. The highest
number of matings are generated by the Adjust Relative/2 Rule when adolescence
length is short to medium, and by the Adjust Up/Down and Adjust Relative Rules
when adolescence is longer. Since in terms of the likelihood of mating no adjustment
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rule dominates every other rule for all adolescence lengths, one needs to consider
additional measures of ‘population-level mating success’ to identify the best adjust-
ment rule. One such measure, Todd and Miller (1999) use in their study, is the mean
mate value of all mated individuals’, with middle values indicating more successful
mate search strategies. Another measure they consider is the mean within-pair differ-
ence in mate value, with lower values indicating strategies that are more successful.
Todd and Miller (1999) show that of the three rules that all dominate the TNB rule
in terms of the likelihood of mating, Adjust Relative/2 has a better performance
in terms of these additional measures of success, than the other two rules, namely
Adjust Up/Down and Adjust Relative, for almost all adolescence lengths.
Clearly, the (ex-post) instability of some matings is inevitable in environments
where matings are decentralized, individuals have incomplete information about po-
tential mates and the search is not exhaustive. The mean difference between the
mate values of partners, as a measure of mating success, can provide some indirect
information about the stability of the mated pairs formed under a particular ad-
justment rule. As already argued by Todd and Miller (1999), with higher values of
this measure an adjustment rule may lead to less stable matings, since mated pairs
with diverse mate values are more prone to the danger of partner switching in a dy-
namic framework. Recently, Eriksson and Ha¨gsstro¨m (2008) has dealt with directly
estimating the degree of instability that one can expect in decentralized matching
environments. Using the proportion of blocking pairs among all possible pairs as
a measure of instability, they show that in environments where all individuals use
a particular heuristic with a threshold lowered gradually over the mate search (as
in Sima˜o and Todd, 2002), the expected instability of matchings tends to zero as
the number of agents grows if individuals’ preferences are random and independent.
Following up this work, Eriksson and Strimling (2009) show, with the help of experi-
mental data, how the total search effort and the expected instability of the matching
outcome vary with various other preference structures.
Inspired by the previous works studying the stability of matching outcomes under
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simple heuristics in mate search, we would like to ask in this study an entirely new,
yet complementary, question: whether the simple heuristics/rules used in the mate
search are themselves stable when individuals can act strategically,6 i.e., whether
all individuals using a particular adjustment rule can be an equilibrium a` la Nash
(1950), of a normal-form game where the set of players involve all individuals in the
population, the strategies of the players are the adjustment rules described above
and the payoff of each player at each strategy profile is his/her likelihood of mating.
2 Mutual Sequential Mate Search Model
We consider the mutual sequential mate search model of Todd and Miller (1999),
where a population N involves a set of males, M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} and a set of
females F = {f1, f2, . . . , fn}, with n > 1. Each individual i ∈ N has a (self) mate
value, v(i), which is a randomly drawn from the uniformly distributed values over the
interval [0, V ]. Mate value of each individual is always unknown to himself/herself.
Mate search consists of two phases. The first phase is called ‘adolescence’ or
‘learning’ phase, where each individual adjusts his/her aspiration level based upon
the adjustment rule he/she follows. This phase consists of S consecutive stages of
dating, with S < n. (In other words, the length of adolescence is S.) At stage
s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}, individual i ∈ N randomly meets a date d(i, s) of opposite sex,
whose mate value v(d(i, s)) is immediately known to individual i. Individual i finds
the date d(i, s) desirable at stage s if v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s − 1), i.e., the mate value
of the date is not below his/her aspiration at the beginning of stage s. Here, it is
assumed that a(i, 0) is exogenously given to individual i at the beginning of stage 1.
Depending on the adjustment rule, individual i and the date d(i, s) may exchange
information as to whether they find each other desirable at stage s. Then, individual
6See Conclusions for a discussion that the same question can be asked in evolutionary environ-
ments where individuals learn to play better search rules by mutations.
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i forms his/her aspiration level, a(i, s), corresponding to stage s.
With the aspiration level a(i, S) formed at the last stage of the adolescence phase,
individual i next enters the second phase of mate search, called the ‘mating’ phase.
This phase may also have multiple stages depending on the mating outcome in the
first stage. At the beginning of the first stage in the mating phase, all individuals
are in the mating pool. In each stage of the mating phase, males and females in the
mating pool are randomly paired to assess each other for a possible mating. If both
individuals in a pair, after learning the mate values of each other, make a proposal
to each other, then they are mated and removed from the mating pool. Otherwise,
both individuals remain in the mating pool, as available for the next stage, if any.
The mating phase ends after a finite stage at which either the mating pool becomes
empty or each individual in the mating pool has already been paired with all available
individuals of the opposite sex.
Below, we describe four adjustment rules (taken from Todd and Miller, 1999),
according to which individuals can update their aspiration levels in the adolescence
phase.
Take the Next Best (TNB) Rule: This is a modification of the 37% rule in the
”secretary problem” (Ferguson, 1989; Seale and Rapoport, 1997), as each individ-
ual dates with (S/n)% of the available candidate mates in the adolescence phase.7
According to this rule, at a stage of dating s, individual i sets the corresponding
7In the secretary problem, an employer must hire the best applicant for a secretarial job, inter-
viewing each applicant one at a time without being able to make a job offer to an already interviewed
applicant. The employer knows the number of applicants but does not know the distribution of the
applicants. In this setup, the optimal strategy of the employer turns out to be first interviewing
(approximately) %37 of the available applicants and choosing in the following hiring period the next
better applicant whose quality is above the quality of the best applicant interviewed. The TNB
Rule considered by Todd (1997, 1999) is similar to the search rule in the secretary problem except
for that (i) the number of potential mates does not need to be known by any individual searching
for a mate and (ii) individuals do not optimize but use heuristics they find to be satisficing.
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aspiration level to the mate value of the date, v(d(i, s)), if individual i finds the date
d(i, s) desirable, and sets it to the aspiration level corresponding to the previous
stage, a(i, s− 1), otherwise. Formally,
a(i, s) =
 v(d(i, s)) if v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),a(i, s− 1) otherwise.
So, individual i enters the mating phase with the aspiration level a(i, S) = max{a(i, 0),
v(d(i, 1)), v(d(i, 2)), . . . , v(d(i, S))}. For this rule, a(i, 0) is assumed to be zero, the
lowest possible mate value.
For the following three adjustment rules, it is assumed that at each stage of
learning each individual is informed by the date whether the date found him/her
desirable. Moreover, for these adjustment rules a(i, 0) is assumed to be V/2, the
mean mate value of all males and of all females.
Adjust Up/Down Rule: This rule is formulated as follows:
a(i, s) =
 a(i, s− 1) + δ¯ if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1),a(i, s− 1)− δ¯ otherwise,
where δ¯ = (n/2)/(1 + S).
Here, individual i adjusts up his/her stage s − 1 aspiration a(i, s − 1) by the
constant δ¯ to obtain stage s aspiration a(i, s) if the date d(i, s) finds individual i
desirable. Otherwise, individual i adjusts down a(i, s− 1) by δ¯ to obtain a(i, s).
Adjust Relative Rule: According to this rule, the aspiration of individual i at
stage s is given by
a(i, s) =

a(i, s− 1) + δ¯ if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1)− δ¯ if v(i) < a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) < a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise,
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where δ¯ = (n/2)/(1 + S).
Differing from the previous rule, now there is the possibility of nonadjusting in
addition to up and down adjusting. Here, individual i adjusts up his/her stage s− 1
aspiration a(i, s− 1) by δ¯ to obtain stage s aspiration a(i, s) if individual i and the
date d(i, s) find each other desirable. If none of the dating individuals i and d(i, s)
finds the other desirable, then individual i adjusts down a(i, s − 1) by δ¯ to obtain
a(i, s). In other possible cases, individual i does not adjust his/her aspiration level
at stage s and he/she sets a(i, s) to a(i, s− 1).
Adjust Relative/2 Rule: This rule differs from the Adjust Relative Rule in that
the size of adjustments is neither constant over the individuals nor over the stages
of adolescence. For individual i, the size of adjustment at stage s is equal to the
half of the difference between the mate value of the date and the aspiration level of
individual i at the end of previous stage. Thus, the rule is given by
a(i, s) =

a(i, s− 1) + δ(i, s) if v(i) ≥ a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) ≥ a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1)− δ(i, s) if v(i) < a(d(i, s), s− 1) and v(d(i, s)) < a(i, s− 1),
a(i, s− 1) otherwise,
where δ(i, s) = |v(d(i, s))− a(i, s− 1)|/2.
Using a population with n = 100 (i.e., 100 males and 100 females), the maximal
mate value V set to 100, and mate values uniformly distributed to individuals, Todd
and Miller (1999) simulated the likelihood of mating (the number of mated pairs
formed) corresponding to each adjustment rule, when the length of adolescence S is
changed from 1 to 90. Considering the same mating environment, we have conducted
200 (Monte Carlo) simulations at each value of S to reproduce their findings in Figure
1. (We have used the GAUSS software for all simulations in this paper. The program
codes and the simulated data are available from the author upon request.)
Apparently, for all considered adolescence lengths, the TNB rule is dominated
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by each of the other rules in terms of the produced likelihood of mating. Figure
1 also shows two sharp findings that for short adolescence lengths (2 ≤ S ≤ 32),
the Adjust Relative/2 Rule generates the highest number of matings among the four
adjustment rules; whereas when adolescence is medium to long (42 ≤ S ≤ 90), the
Adjust Up/Down Rule generates the highest number of matings, performing slightly
better than the Adjust Relative Rule. It is also evident that both Adjust Up/Down
and Adjust Relative are significantly superior to Adjust Relative/2 when adolescence
is long.
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Figure 1. The number of successful mates
3 Stability of Adjustment Rules
We will check whether all individuals using a particular adjustment rule can be a
Nash equilibrium of a normal-form strategic game played right before the adolescence
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phase. In this game, the set of players involve all individuals in the population, the
strategies of the players are restricted to the four adjustment rules we have described
above and the payoff of each player at each strategy profile is simply his/her likelihood
of mating. For a formal treatment, we introduce the following definitions.
Let R = {TNB, Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative, Adjust Relative/2} denote
the strategy space of each individual i. Let r = (rm1 , . . . , rmn , rf1 , . . . , rfn) ∈ R2n
denote the strategy profile of the society. In particular, we denote by rTNB the
strategy profile at which each individual plays the strategy TNB, i.e. rTNBi = TNB
for all i ∈ N . We similarly define the strategy profiles rAUD, rAR, and rAR2 such that
all individuals in the society play Adjust Up/Down under the profile rAUD, Adjust
Relative under rAR, and Adjust Relative/2 under rAR2. Also, for all i and r ∈ R2n
define the 2n − 1 dimensional profile r−i such that r = (ri, r−i). For any strategy
profile r ∈ R2n, let µi(r) denote the likelihood that individual i is mated to someone
of the opposite sex when he/she uses the strategy ri, while the rest of the society
uses their respective strategies in r−i.
We say that a strategy profile r is a Nash equilibrium if there exists no individual
that can increase his/her likelihood of mating by unilaterally deviating from this
profile by changing his/her strategy ri to any other strategy r
′
i in R; i.e., the profile
r = (ri, r−i) ∈ R2n is a Nash equilibrium if
µi(ri, r−i) ≥ µi(r′i, r−i) for all i and for all r′i ∈ R.
Below, we explore whether any of the profiles rTNB, rAUD, rAR, and rAR2 is a Nash
equilibrium for any length of adolescence. For each of these profiles, we make 200
Monte Carlo simulations at each value of S between 1 and 90. At each simulation,
we randomly pick one of the individuals (i.e., %1 of 100 individuals of a particular
sex) to be a potential deviant and check whether this individual can increase his/her
likelihood of mating by unilaterally switching from the population’s common strategy
to any other strategy in R. (Since the model is completely symmetric with respect
to all individuals, checking whether or not an arbitrarily chosen individual has an
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incentive to deviate is sufficient for our purpose.)
We check in Figure 2 whether rTNB is a Nash equilibrium profile for any length
of adolescence. To that end, we simply compare the values of µi(r
TNB) (in blue
marked points), denoting the likelihood individual i is mated when he/she sticks
to the common strategy TNB of the rest of the population, with the values of
max
r′i∈R\{T NB} µi(r
′
i, r
TNB
−i ) (in red marked points), denoting the likelihood individ-
ual i is mated when he/she deviates to the best alternative strategy in R\{TNB}.
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Figure 2. The mating likelihood of a potential deviant when he/she plays TNB
versus the best alternative rule, while the rest of the society plays TNB.
It is apparent in Figure 2 that rTNB is not a Nash equilibrium profile for any value
of S = 1, 2, . . . , 90. This result is not surprising since unlike the other rules TNB
makes adjustments always in the upward direction and does not depend on whether
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the potential deviant is found desirable by his/her date. Therefore, the aspiration
level of a potential deviant in the mating phase is higher under TNB than under the
alternative adjustment rules. Since the lower the aspiration level of an individual,
the more likely he/she will accept a proposal in the mating period, an individual can
increase his/her likelihood of mating by switching from TNB to the best alternative
strategy in R.
In Figure 3 we show that rAUD is not a Nash equilibrium profile for short to
medium lengths of adolescence (S < 46). For higher lengths of adolescence, rAUD
may turn out to be a Nash equilibrium profile. Yet, this is only true for 12 out of all
values of S between 46 and 90.
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Figure 3. The mating likelihood of a potential deviant when he/she plays AUD
versus the best alternative rule, when the rest of the society plays AUD.
A closer inspection of the simulation data generating Figure 3 also reveals that
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a randomly selected individual prefers to play Adjust Relative at 65 values of S and
Adjust Relative/2 at only 13 values of S, out of a total of 78 distinct values of S at
which he/she finds it optimal to deviate from the Adjust Up/Down Rule.
M
a
t i
n
g
  
L i
k e
l i
h
o
o
d
  
o
f  
 D
e
v
i a
n
t  
 (
%
)
40
50
60
70
Deviant Plays AR Deviant Plays the Best Rule in {TNB, AUD, AR2}
M
a
t i
n
g
  
L i
k e
l i
h
o
o
d
  
o
f  
 D
e
v
i a
n
t  
 (
%
)
Length  of  Adolescence  (Number of Dates, S)
0
10
20
30
1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
Figure 4. The mating likelihood of a potential deviant when he/she plays AR
versus the best alternative rule, when the rest of the society plays AR.
In Figure 4, we illustrate that rAR is a Nash equilibrium profile for most of the
medium to high lengths of adolescence (i.e., for all values of S exceeding 55 and for 22
values of S between 28 and 55). whereas for most of the short lengths of adolescence
(i.e., for 22 out of the lowest 27 values of S) an arbitrary individual has an incentive
to unilaterally deviate from playing Adjust Relative. Only at four out of 28 values
S where rAR is not found to be a Nash equilibrium, the deviating individual prefers
to play Adjust Up/Down, while he/she plays Adjust Relative/2 in the remaining 24
instances.
14
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Figure 5. The mating likelihood of a potential deviant when he/she plays AR2
versus the best alternative rule, when the rest of the society plays AR2.
Finally, in Figure 5 we plot the equilibrium results for Adjust Relative/2. Here,
we find that rAR2 is not a Nash equilibrium profile for any value of S exceeding 33.
In the view of the potential deviant, playing alternative adjustment rules rather than
Adjust Relative/2 seems to be attractive for shorter lengths of adolescence, as well;
indeed we find that only for 7 of the lowest 33 values of S, the profile rAR2 can arise
as a Nash equilibrium. In more detail, the deviating individual prefers to play Adjust
Relative in 68 out of 83 values of S at which rAR2 is not a Nash equilibrium, whereas
he/she plays Adjust Up/Down in the remaining 15 cases.
From the above results, we immediately notice that for a majority of adolescence
lengths, the Adjust Relative Rule is the best strategy of a deviant at both of the
profiles rAUD and rAR2. This is so, despite the observation in Figure 1 that Adjust
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Up/Down dominates both the Adjust Relative and Adjust Relative/2 Rules, in terms
of the induced likelihood of mating, for more than half of the considered values of
S (i.e., for 42 ≤ S ≤ 90) while the Adjust Relative and Adjust Relative/2 Rules
generate quite similar outcomes on the average over the whole simulation range.
Interestingly, these two rules that are inferior to Adjust Up/Down for a majority
of adolescence lengths when they are played by the whole population can become
superior to it for some adolescence lengths when they are played singly by any indi-
vidual. A possible explanation underlying this phenomenon may be related to the
variance of aspirations generated by these rules. We observe that although the rules,
Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative, and Adjust Relative/2, have almost the same
mean aspiration level, close to the mean mate value of 50, for almost all adolescence
lengths, the standard deviation of aspiration around the mean value is significantly
different for these rules, as reported below for a sample of values of S.
Table 1. The mean value of the standard deviation of aspiration levels
under the rules AUD, AR, and AR2
S AUD AR AR2
10 34,01 16,55 24,16
30 34,64 16,62 27,95
50 34,69 16,94 28,34
70 34,92 16,92 28,68
90 34,76 16,85 28,80
In the above table, the standard deviation of aspirations is lower under the rules
Adjust Relative (around 16) and Adjust Relative/2 (between 24-29) than under Ad-
just Up/Down (around 34) since not only that the former rules allow the possibility
of nonadjusting the aspiration after a date, but also the conditions for adjusting it
are stronger (as the mutual desirability of the dating partners is required). On the
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other hand, the reason why Adjust Relative and Adjust Relative/2 themselves yield
significantly different standard deviations of aspirations should be the difference of
the size of adjustments in the definition of these two rules. Considering our findings,
it seems that the smaller the variance of aspirations generated by a particular adjust-
ment rule, the more likely its survival against the alternative strategies of potential
deviants, yet a formal proof of the relation between the stability of a rule and the
induced aspirations in agent-based models is left to future research.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied whether the use of a particular heuristic by the whole
population in mutual sequential mate search can be a stable situation, where no
individual has any incentive to use an alternative heuristic in order to increase his/her
likelihood of mating. For our purpose, we have considered the Nash equilibrium as a
proper concept of stability, and have restricted our focus on mate search heuristics to
four rules, namely TNB, Adjust Up/Down, Adjust Relative, and Adjust Relative/2,
that were considered by Todd and Miller (1999). Using a two-phase search model
of theirs, which involves an adolescence phase and a mating phase, we have showed
that in the whole simulation range of adolescence lengths, the unanimous use of the
TNB Rule by the whole population never arises as an equilibrium of a strategic game
played right before the adolescence phase. Of the other three rules, Adjust Up/Down
and Adjust Relative/2 have been observed as a Nash equilibrium play, though only
for a small part of the simulation range; the former arising when the adolescence
is long and the latter arising when the adolescence is short. On the other side,
the Adjust Relative Rule has been an equilibrium strategy for the whole population
for a great part of the simulation range, especially for medium to high adolescence
lengths. Taking stock of our results, the stability of heuristics as a new measure
of mating success points to that among the mate search rules we have considered,
the Adjust Relative Rule appears to be the one which is most likely to survive in
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strategic environments.
We believe that the contribution of this study to the previous literature on mate
search is at least twofold. First, we add some new results to a very thin literature
dealing with the stability issues in agent-based search models, hoping to narrow down
the existing gap between the priorities of stable matching theory and agent-based
mate search. However, unlike the previous works (Eriksson and Ha¨gsstro¨m, 2008;
Eriksson and Strimling, 2009), our focus is on the stability of mate search heuristics,
using the Nash equilibrium concept, instead of the stability of matching outcome
in the usual definitions of blocking individuals or pairs, since the latter can be a
relevant measure of success to distinguish between alternative search heuristics in
mate search models only if these heuristics are themselves stable in the long-run
with respect to the invasion of alternative heuristics. Second, since a particular
search heuristic can be stable, or form a Nash equilibrium, only if no individual in
the population has any incentive to unilaterally switch to an alternative heuristic,
our results shows the robustness of some of the search heuristics considered by Todd
and Miller (1997, 1999) with respect to the assumption that the whole population
uses the same particular heuristic during the mate search.
One potential criticism to our study, as it deals with the stability of simple heuris-
tical search rules in a model with assumedly non-optimizing agents, could be that
we restrict our stability notion, for the calculational simplicity, to an ‘intelligent’
concept such as Nash equilibrium, which requires that the beliefs of each individ-
ual about what strategies are likely to be played by other individuals are common
knowledge and also that each individual is endowed with the skill of performing
optimization over the outcomes of alternative strategies. However, our appeal to
the Nash equilibrium concept is not wholly illegitimate since an observation that
the play of a particular heuristic by the whole population is not a Nash equilibrium
would directly point to the existence of a better heuristic from the viewpoint of a
unilaterally deviating individual. Clearly, such an individual could find the merit of
playing this alternative heuristic also under the notion of evolutionary stable strate-
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gies introduced by the evolutionary model of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) and
Maynard Smith (1974), which involve non-optimizing individuals (players) some of
whom may deviate from a particular common (incumbent) rule only because they
are programmed to do so or alternatively by ‘simple’ or ‘unsophisticated’ reasons,
involving mistakes, ignorance, etc, simply called ‘mutations’.8
Finally, we should notice that the possibility of unilateral deviations of individu-
als - under the stability concept we have considered - from a particular search rule
commonly used by the whole population to another search rule naturally brings in
a broader question as to why the mate search model does not set, in the first place,
each individual in the mating population entirely free, in using any available search
rule during the mate search, independent from the set of rules used by other indi-
viduals. Constructing such a heterogenous model of mate search, the future research
may profitably deal with finding the efficient distributions of search rules among the
individuals in a given mating population (or equivalently, the optimal asymmetry
level in the model) that will optimize a particular measure of mating success. Using
the approach in this paper, one could also search for stable distributions of search
rules, and in particular the stable distributions among the efficient ones.
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